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ARTICLES
IN DEFENSE OF CHARITIES: A CASE FOR
MAINTAINING THE MASSACHUSETTS
DAMAGES CAP FOR CERTAIN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
NATHAN

A.

OLlN*

This article is directed at lawyers who work with or for chari
ties in Massachusetts. Earlier this year the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court put to rest a mini-debate that had been brewing in
the employment bar for some time: are discrimination claims
brought against public charities pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B
(hereinafter "chapter 151B") torts subject to the $20,000 damages
cap of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85K? In Ayash v. Dana-Farber
Cancer Institute, 822 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 2005), the Supreme Judicial
Court emphatically said "no." Accordingly, Massachusetts syna
gogues, food pantries, and homeless shelters sued by disgruntled
employees for discrimination may no longer seek to minimize huge
damage awards merely because they are charities, at least insofar as
the discrimination claims against them arise under state law.
Does this make sense? Wasn't the $20,000 cap put in place to
keep charities open and serving the poor, hungry, and sick? And
haven't chapter 151B claims-since the beginning of time-always
been viewed as torts? Moreover, must the same result be reached
with respect to the main federal anti-discrimination in employment

* Nathan A. Olin is an attorney working in the chambers of United States Magis
trate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman of the District of Massachusetts and an adjunct profes
sor of employment law, torts, litigation, and legal research and writing at Bay Path
College. A graduate of Northeastern Law School and a former litigator at Robinson &
Cole LLP, Mr. Olin has written and lectured on various legal topics and is proud to
have served a number of public charities in the commonwealth. He thanks his family
for their patience and the good people at both the Drama Studio and Trinity United
Methodist Church for the important public interest work they perform in the greater
Springfield area. The views expressed in this article are entirely the author's own.
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statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e
et seq. (hereinafter "Title VII")?
Well, fellow do-gooders, the Supreme Judicial Court has spo
ken and it is probably too late to put the chapter 151B genie back in
the bottle. For better or for worse, charities sued for unlawful em
ployment discrimination under chapter 151B should prepare to face
the prospect of uncapped damages. A different result, however,
can be reached with respect to Title VII claims. Public charities
may argue that the language of Title VII fits snugly within the brim
of the damages cap.
Part I of this Article sets forth a brief history of section 85K,
the state charity cap statute. Part II analyzes chapter 151B, specifi
cally its relationship to section 85K, and culminates in a discussion
of Ayash. Part III describes Title VII and proposes a charity
friendly application of section 85K to this federal anti-discrimina
tion statute.
I.

SECTION

85K

In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, charities are under attack,
often for good reason. Watchdog web sites are scrutinizing how
charities spend their donations, l consumer associations are rating
charities on a variety of scales? and the state Attorney General's
Division of Public Charities is working to ensure the proper use and
solicitation of charitable funds. 3 Unfortunately, church sex-abuse
scandals, the auctioning of donor lists by dubious charities, and un
scrupulous telemarketing strategies by others have not helped the
overall goal of philanthropy. Perhaps, then, it's unsurprising that
the historic legal protections for charities continue to be assaulted.
For well over a century, charities in Massachusetts, as well as
elsewhere in the country, enjoyed complete immunity from tort lia
bility.4 The so-called "charitable immunity doctrine" originated in
1. See Bruce Mohl, It is Better to Give when not Being Deceived: Watchdog Web
sites Track how Charities Spend Their Money, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2004, at L1
(describing ,;'Charity Navigator" and "Guide star" as "charity watchdogs created by
businessmen frustrated with the lack of reliable information available to donors").
2. See id. (noting that ratings established by the Better Business Bureau can be
found at http://www.give.org while those of the American Institute of Philanthropy are
located at http://www.charitywatch.org).
3. The Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, Division of Public
Charities, The Attorney General's Commitment to Ensuring Proper Use of Charitable
Funds, http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=972 (last visited on October 14,
2005).
4. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005).
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two British decisions from the first half of the nineteenth century.5
As applied in this country, the charitable immunity doctrine was
based on three separate theories: (1) the protection of charitable
trust funds; (2) an implied waiver by injured persons through ac
ceptance of a charity's benefits; and (3) public policy.6
If you work with charities, you understand that these theories
have resonance today as well. Charitable money is always scarce,
particularly in Massachusetts's tight economy.7 There are also con
troversial policies being pursued at the highest levels of government
to encourage private, philanthropic solutions to social ills. 8
In December of 1969, however, the Supreme Judicial Court is
sued a wake-up call. 9 In a tragic wrongful death case against a not
for-profit hospital, the court stated that while "[n]othing has been
brought to our attention suggesting that the doctrine of charitable
immunity is repugnant to any provision of the Constitutions of the
United States and the Commonwealth ... it appears that only three
or four States still adhere to the doctrine."lo "Accordingly," the
court continued, "we take this occasion to give adequate warning
that the next time we are squarely confronted by a legal question
respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our intention to
abolish it."l1
The Massachusetts Legislature responded quickly to the Su
preme Judicial Court's salvo, enacting section 85K as an "emer
gency law" on September 16, 1971.12 In summary, the statute
abolished the charitable immunity defense-thus placating the Su
preme Judicial Court-but put a $20,000 damages cap on "any
5. Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin 507, 8 Eng Reprint 1508
(1846); Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Clark & Fin 894, 7 Eng Reprint 934 (1839).
6. See Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 421 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1966); Roland v. Catholic
Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. App. 1957); see also McDonald v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
7. According to the Associated Grant Makers May 2005 report, Massachusetts
ranks forty-first in the nation in giving as a percentage of personal income. ASSOCIATED
GRANT MAKERS, GIVING IN MASSACHUSETTS 2 (May 2005), available at http://
www.agmconnect.org/givingreport.pdf (last visited October 14, 2005).
8. For example, President George W. Bush continues to push a variety of faith
based and community initiatives. See White House Office of Faith-Based and Commu
nity Initiatives, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci (last visited
October 14, 2005).
9. Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Mass. 1969).
10. Id.
11. Id. Two decades later, the Supreme Judicial Court softened its language, not
ing that Colby actually "suggested that the doctrine of charitable immunity is constitu
tional." English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989).
12. 1971 Mass. Acts 674.
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cause of action based on tort" where "the tort was committed in the
course of any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charita
ble purposes of" a charitable organization. 13
Is the cap too low? Perhaps. Should the definition of "char
ity" be modified, for example, to remove insured hospitals from its
scope?14 Maybe. Just as there are strong justifications for the cap,
there are also persuasive policy reasons for its abolition. IS None
theless, section 85K exists-unless and until it gets amended or re
pealed by the Legislature -and it remains the duty of the courts, as
with any statute, to interpret its terms.
The Supreme Judicial Court has had a number of occasions to
interpret section 85K, most recently in Ayash. 16 In 1989, the En
glish court found the cap to be constitutional,17 In so holding, the
court noted that the "clearly legitimate" objective of section 85K "is
to protect the funds of charitable institutions so they may be de
voted to charitable purposes."18 "If a charity's property were 'de
pleted by the payment of damages,''' the Supreme Judicial Court
continued, "'its usefulness might be either impaired or wholly de
stroyed, the object of the founder or donors defeated, and charita
13. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005). The first paragraph of the statute
provides:
It shall not constitute a defense to any cause of action based on tort brought
against a corporation, trustees of a trust, or members of an association that
said corporation, trust, or association is or at the time the cause of action arose
was a charity; provided, that if the tort was committed in the course of any
activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of such cor
poration, trust, or association, liability in any such cause of action shall not
exceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs. Not
withstanding any other provision of this section, the liability of charitable cor
porations, the trustees of charitable trusts, and the members of charitable
associations shall not be subject to the limitations set forth in this section if the
tort was committed in the course of activities primarily commercial in charac
ter even though carried on to obtain revenue to be used for charitable
purposes.
Id. In 1987, a second paragraph was added exculpating directors, officers and trustees
of charitable educational institutions from individual liability (except for motor vehicle
incidents) so long as "such person was acting in good faith and within the scope of his
official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by willful or wan
ton misconduct." Id. (as amended by 1987 Mass. Acts 508).
14. A Westlaw search conducted on October 14, 2005 revealed that hospitals or
health centers were defendants in approximately one-half of the reported and unre
ported state decisions addressing section 85K over the past thirty-five years.
15. See Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E. 2d 407 (Mass. 1969).
16. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E. 2d 667 (Mass. 2005).
17. English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Mass. 1989).
18. Id. at 333.
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ble gifts discouraged."'19 Subsequent decisions have tackled the
question of what constitutes a "charity,"20 and have determined
that the cap does not apply where a compensated officer of the
charity is a defendant,21 and held that the cap may not be stricken
as a discovery sanction. 22 For more than three decades, however,
the cap has survived intact.
Even so, the Supreme Judicial Court has recently demon
strated a desire to dissociate the cap from statutory causes of action.
For example, in 1997, the court held that the cap did not apply to
damages awarded under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A (hereinafter
"chapter 93A"), the state's consumer protection act, "because that
statute created 'broad new rights, forbidding conduct not previously
unlawful under the common law of contract and tort or under any
prior statute.' "23 Similarly, in 1998, the court held that section 85K
did not apply to a claim that a charity violated the state wiretapping
statute. 24 In so doing, the court applied the same reasoning as in
the chapter 93A case. 2S
Of course, section 85K never mentions an exception for stat
ute-based causes of action; as described, the cap applies to "any
cause of action based on tort."26 Moreover, it is clear that many
tort claims arise pursuant to statute, for example, claims under the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA")27 or the Federal Em
ployers' Liability Act (hereinafter "FELA").28 Yet the Supreme
Judicial Court felt compelled to put on the brakes-at least with
regard to chapter 93A and wiretap act claims-and now with regard
to chapter 151B discrimination claims.

19. Id. (quoting St. Clair v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 521 N.E. 2d 1044 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1988».
20. Connors v. Northeast Hosp. Corp., 789 N.E.2d 129, 133-35 (Mass. 2003);
Harlow v. Chin, 545 N.E.2d 602, 613 (Mass. 1989).
21. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coli., 449 N.E.2d 331,341-42 (Mass. 1983).
22. Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 836 (Mass. 2003).
23. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E. 2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005) (quot
ing Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 679 N.E.2d 191, 209 (Mass. 1997».
24. See id. (citing BirbigJia v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Mass.
1998».
25. See id.
26. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (emphasis added).
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (2005).
28. 45 US.c. §§ 51-60 (2005).
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CHAPTER 151B

Chapter 151B in a Nutshell

In 1946, a full quarter-century prior to the passage of section
85K, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted chapter 151B.29 As
originally passed, section 1 of the statute provided that "[t]he right
to work without discrimination because of race, color, religious
creed, national origin or ancestry is hereby declared to be a right
and privilege of the inhabitants of the commonwealth."30 Over the
past six decades, the Legislature has tinkered with various provi
sions,3! but the "clear purpose" of the statute remains "to imple
ment the right to equal treatment guaranteed to all citizens."32
When initially passed, chapter 151B was not as earth-shattering
as one might imagine since a number of employee-friendly common
law causes of actions already existed. "The statute broadens ex
isting remedies," the Supreme Judicial Court stated in 1982.33 Or,
in the words of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, "[l]ong before
the passage of" chapter 151B, disgruntled employees could sue
their employers under a variety of tort-based theories, including for
example "the common law tort of interference with an advanta
geous relationship."34 In fact, as recently as April 2005, the Ap
peals Court continued to look to the common law in order to
interpret provisions of chapter 151B.35 The Supreme Judicial
Court, too, recently reaffirmed chapter 151B's tort roots in
Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination. 36
29. 1946 Mass. Acts 372.
30. 1946 Mass. Acts 372, § 1.
31. The main operative provision of chapter 151B, section 4, has been amended,
on average, about once per year since 1946. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4
(West 2004) (historical and statutory notes).
32. Katz v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 312 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass.
1974).
33. Corney v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Mass. 1982).
34. Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); see
Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. Rev. 1993,
1993 (1989) (noting that "the common law has long embraced a principle of antidis
crimination that requires that parties engaged in public callings-so-called 'public ser
vice companies'-serve the general public on a nondiscriminatory basis").
35. See Lowery v. Klemm, 825 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (holding
that a volunteer is not an "employee" under traditional common law standards and thus
cannot invoke chapter 151B); see also Marc D. Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L. QUAR. 65 (1985) (suggesting recognition of
employment discrimination claims as extensions of the common law).
36. 808 N.E.2d 205, 214 (Mass. 2004) ("Independent research indicates that, from
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As presently configured, chapter 151B prohibits a variety of
employment acts.37 Primarily, section 4 of the statute provides that
it shall be an "unlawful practice" for an employer "to refuse to hire
or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment" any individ
ual "because of the race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex,
[or] sexual orientation" of that individual.38 The statute also pro
tects certain older workers39 and handicapped employees40 by mak
ing it unlawful "[f]or any person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with another person in the exercise or enjoyment of any
right granted or protected by chapter 151B,"41 and requires em
ployers to maintain policies against sexual harassment. 42 It also
guards against unlawful retaliation by employers,43 the discrimina
tion provision at issue in Ayash.
The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (here
inafter "MCAD") is charged with "formulat[ing] policies to effectu
ate the purposes of [chapter 151B]."44 In addition, the statute
establishes a comprehensive scheme, bolstered by MCAD regula
tions, for administrative procedures and, as necessary, judicial re
view. 45 Finally, chapter 151B states that its provisions are to "be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes."46
Most cases construing chapter 151B have concerned current
employees (as well as former and prospective employees) alleging
discrimination or retaliation by employers due to their status as
members of a protected class. A typical scenario is this. An em
ployee, sayan African-American woman, is fired from her job-for
our purposes, we will assume her job was at a food pantry-shortly
after she complains of either sexual or racial harassment. Although
the food pantry proffers a "legitimate business reason" for the ter
mination, the employee senses pretext and thus brings an adminis
the late 1700's until midway through the 1800's, common law in both England and the
American States provided for an employee's cause of action against an employer for
wrongful discharge or breach of employment contract." (citing Feinman, The Develop
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HrsT. 118, 118 (1976»).
37. See generally Douglas A. Randall & Douglas E. Franklin, 18 Mass. Prac. § 281
(2005).
38. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15lB, § 4(1) (2005).
39. Id. § 4(lB).
40. Id. § 4(16).
41. Id. § 4(4A).
42. Id. § 3A.
43. [d. § 4(4).
44. [d. §§ 2, 3.
45. See id. §§ 5-9.
46. Id. § 9.
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trative complaint to the MCAD. There she may receive a "right to
sue" letter. Accordingly, she files a complaint in court in which she
alleges that the food pantry's actions in firing her violated chapter
151B and/or Title VII. Discovery proceeds and either the parties
settle, the employer moves for summary judgment, or the case is
marked up for trial. Common law claims such as defamation or
negligent infliction of emotional distress are likely asserted as well.
What relief might our hypothetical plaintiff seek? According
to chapter 151B, she is entitled to "damages or injunctive relief."47
Most plaintiffs seek damages. "Compensatory damages may in
clude those that make [the plaintiff] whole, ... 'including those
which are the natural and probable consequences ... of the illegal
conduct.' "48 Typically, these involve back pay, front pay, lost bene
fits, emotional distress damages, attorneys fees, and court costS.49
Punitive damages may also be awarded "where [the employer's]
conduct warrants condemnation and deterrence."5o If section 85K
applies, however, the plaintiff's damages would be capped at
$20,000. If not, her damages could easily swell to hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of dollars.51
Of course, there are clear policy reasons to hold the food pan
try liable for one hundred percent of the damages it caused our
hypothetical plaintiff. However, it is equally clear that there are
countervailing policy reasons favoring the food pantry, not the least
of which is the protection of its limited resources. In addition, and
perhaps more to the point, the court should not make policy deci
sions by torturing section 85K's text.
B.

Pre-Ayash Cases Construing Section 85K's Relationship to
Chapter 151B

As described above, section 85K applies to "any cause of ac
tion based on tort" where "the tort was committed in the course of
47. Id.
48. Blockel v. J.e. Penney Co., 337 F.3d 17,27 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Conway v.
Electro Switch Corp., 523 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Mass. 1988» (alterations in original).
49. See Conway, 523 N.E.2d at 256; Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 211 F. Supp.
2d 291 (D. Mass. 2002), rev'd, 77 Fed. Appx. 24 (1st Cir. 2003); Gasior v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., No. 20012772H, 2005 WL 1367182, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2005).
50. Blockel, 337 F.3d at 28.
51. In one particular employment discrimination case, a jury awarded over one
million dollars in damages, a figure that was later reduced to the still hefty sum of
$582,225. Horney, 77 Fed. Appx. at 24; see Verdict and Settlement Summary, Edwards
v. Mass. Bay Transit Auth., JVR No. 802-380, 2001 WL 910047 (Mass. Super. Ct. June
2001) (reporting chapter 151B plaintiff's verdict of $7,602,999).

2005]

IN DEFENSE OF CHARITIES

19

any activity carried on to accomplish directly the charitable pur
poses of" the charitable organization. 52 In our hypothetical, we will
assume that the firing of the food pantry worker occurred while the
employer was directly pursuing its "charitable purposes." The sec
tion 85K question for the hypothetical court, therefore, is whether
the discriminatory retaliation committed by the employer was a
"cause of action based on tort."53
Prior to Ayash, the charity would have had a fighting chance of
coming within the cap. Granted, the Supreme Judicial Court had
occasionally "distinguished [chapter 151B] discrimination actions
from tort actions. "54 Still, the court had also conceded that it "re
ferred frequently to tort-like aspects of claims of discrimination
under . . . [chapter] 151B. "55 For example, in Conway v. Electro
Switch Corp., the court held that lost "front pay" was compensable
in a chapter 151B action insofar as such a remedy had been "tradi
tionally allowed, as an element of tort damages."56 Similarly, in
Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc., the court held that discrimination
plaintiffs, like all other tort victims, have a constitutional right to a
jury trial,57 In so holding, the court found chapter 151B claims to
be "analogous" to common law tort claims, particularly to "ac
tion[s] for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. "58
Despite these pro-charity messages emanating from the Su
preme Judicial Court, several trial court decisions opined, without
any real discussion, that chapter 151B claims would not be recog
nized as "torts" for purposes of the charitable damages cap.59 Such
a result was also foreshadowed by the United States Court of Ap
peals for the First Circuit. In McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005) (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Thomas v. EDI Specialists, Inc., 773 N.E.2d, 415, 418 (Mass. 2002) (refusing
to recognize chapter 151H contribution action by employer); see also Stone hill Coll. v.
Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Mass. 2004) (noting that
"we have, on many occasions, identified tort-like aspects of a ... discrimination claim,"
but that "a violation of G. L. c. 151H is not a tort"); Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of Everett,
658 N.E.2d 162, 173 (Mass. 1995) ("[A]cts of discrimination-whether intentional or
unintentional-do not thereby become torts. ").
55. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 688 (2005).
56. 523 N. E. 2d 255, 257 (Mass. 1988) (citing, inter alia, Mitchell v. Walton Lunch
Co., 25 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1940».
57. 636 N. E. 2d 212, 214 (Mass. 1994).
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. See, e.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 168
F.R.D. 94, 96-97 (D. Mass. 1995), affd, 140 F.3d 288 (1998); Walsh v. Carney Hosp.
Corp., No. 94-2583, 1998 WL 1470698, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 10, 1998) (citing,
inter alia, Forti v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 92-3948 (Middlesex Sup. Ct. June 5, 1996».
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit concluded that the MSPCA's liability on a chapter 151B
claim was not limited by section 85K's damage cap.60 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit stated, "Like chapter 93A, chapter
151B creates rights that did not exist under the common law; the
causes of action to which it gives rise thus cannot properly be called
causes of action in tort."61 "Accordingly," the court continued, "we
hold that the damages award to [the plaintiff] pursuant to chapter
151B is not subject to the constraints of [section 85K]."62
Somewhat curiously, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reached this decision-and thus dramatically changed the state-law
landscape-without certifying the question to the Supreme Judicial
Court63 or, as it had done with other controversial state-law mat
ters, avoiding the issue altogether. 64 Moreover, it was obviously the
Supreme Judicial Court's voice that mattered, not that of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit. In addition, there remained the
argument that chapter 151B need not be a "tort" to be constrained
by section 85K, only that it be "any cause of action based on tor1."65
That nuance had not (and apparently has still not) been explored by
any court. Even so, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
McMillan decision was a rifle shot across Massachusetts's charitable
landscape.
C.

Ayash Holds that Chapter 151B Retaliation Claims Against
Charities are not Subject to the Damages Cap.

Interesting as the pre-Ayash debate might have been, the hold
ing in Ayash is clear: "[Section] 85K does not apply to limit dam
ages awarded pursuant to a successful claim of unlawful retaliation
under [chapter] 151B."66 However, this does not mean that Ayash
was properly decided.
The facts in Ayash are gut-wrenching. In November 1994, a
research fellow at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, a public char
ity for section 85K purposes, "accidentally ordered four-fold over
60. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288,
307 (1st Cir. 1998).
61. Id. (citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. See MASS. R. SUP. J. CT. 1:03.
64. See Martel v. Stafford, 992 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that
federal courts should not "steer state law into unprecedented configurations").
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005).
66. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 687 (Mass. 2005).
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doses of ... a powerful chemotherapy drug with well known heart
toxicity for two patients in an experimental [breast cancer] proto
col."67 Both patients suffered almost immediate adverse reactions.
One patient died. The other patient lived, but experienced severe
cardiac damage. 68 Perhaps because the deceased victim was a Bos
ton Globe health columnist, there was intense media scrutiny and a
number of investigations. 69 Ultimately, fingers were pointed at Dr.
Lois Ayash, the protocol chair and principal investigator, resulting
in the hospital taking disciplinary actions against her.70 Most nota
bly, Dr. Ayash was fired shortly after she sued the hospital in state
courU1 Accordingly, she thereafter amended her complaint to in
clude a claim against the hospital for unlawful retaliation in viola
tion of chapter 151B.72
After a five week trial, the jury found the hospital liable,
among other common law claims, for discriminatory retaliation in
violation of chapter 151B.73 The jury awarded Dr. Ayash over $1.2
million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages and almost
$400,000 in attorney's fees and costS.74 The trial judge, however,
agreed with the hospital that section 85K's cap applied and, accord
ingly, entered an amended judgment allowing the plaintiff to re
cover only $20,000 in damages.75 Dr. Ayash appealed, and, on
October 6, 2004, the Supreme Judicial Court heard oral argument.
The court issued its decision on February 5, 2005. According to the
Supreme Judicial Court, the cap did not apply.76
Curiously, the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court's forty
one page decision dealt with issues other than the charitable cap,
for example, Dana-Farber's cross appeal and appeals by the hospi
tal administrator (who was found liable for damages of $840,000),
the Globe Newspaper Company (which was found liable for dam
ages of $1,680,000), and a reporter (who was found liable for dam
ages of $420,000).77 A few paragraphs, however, were devoted to
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

675.
676.
673.
675-80.
680-81.
681.
674.
674 n.5.
674-75.
687-88.
674.
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the hospital's arguments with respect to section 85K's cap.78 The
court rejected those arguments.
First, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Court of Ap
peals for the First Circuit in McMillan, that chapter 151B, like chap
ter 93A, created rights that did not exist under the common law
and, ergo, chapter 151B claims should not be considered torts for
purposes of section 85K.7 9 There are several problems with this
conclusion. For one, the Supreme Judicial Court apparently ig
nored its previous pronouncements that chapter 151B broadened
the existing common law tort remedies. 80 The court also seemed to
have conflated the term "torts"81 with the actual language used in
chapter 85K: "any cause of action based on tor1."82 Surely a cause
of action can be "based on tort" without being a complete "tort" in
and of itself. Indeed, that was the very distinction the court drew in
Stonehill College (and again in Ayash) when it stated that chapter
151B claims of discrimination contain "tort-like aspects."83
Second, the court noted that section 85K is limited to circum
stances where the cause of action is "committed in the course of any
activity carried on to accomplish directly [a defendant's] charitable
purposes."84 But clearly, the hospital thought it was acting for the
good of the charity when it discriminated against the plaintiff. It
was insulating itself against patient lawsuits and bad pUblicity.
Moreover, as the court itself recognized, just because the plaintiff's
circumstances may be "compelling" does not mean that the "chari
table purpose" limitation should not apply.85 "The purpose behind
the charitable cap," the court acknowledged, "was 'to protect the
funds [and other assets] of charitable institutions so they may be
devoted to charitable purposes.' "86
Third, the Supreme Judicial Court looked to chapter 151B's
legislative history. As the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out,
78. Id. at 687-88.
79. Id. at 687. '
80. Corney v. Hill, 438 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Mass. 1982); see supra text accompanying
note 33.
81. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 687; see id. at 687 n.20 (citing Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of
Everett, 658 N.E.2d 162, 173 (Mass. 1995) for the proposition that "acts of discrimina
tion ... do not thereby become torts").
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005).
83. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 688 (citing Stonehill Coli. v. Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205, 215 (Mass. 2004».
84. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2005».
85. Id.
86. /d. at 687-88 (quoting English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 329,
333 (Mass. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990» (alteration in original).
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charitable and religious organizations were initially exempted from
the definition of "employers" subject to chapter 151B liability.87
Noting that the exemption was lifted in 1969, the Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that the Legislature desired to make charities
"subject to the same provisions and remedies as other employers
for claims brought under" chapter 151B.88 In a general sense, that
was probably true. 89 But it appears more likely that, in 1969, the
legislature was focused on the insular problems surrounding the
regulation of religious institutions, i.e., free exercise challenges. In
deed, the amendment was linked to another one that specified that
such organizations could still discriminate on the basis of religion. 90
In short, there appears to have been absolutely no indication that
the legislature, in 1969, was seeking to rewrite the definition of
"torts" or causes of action "based on tort."
Regardless of whether Ayash properly interpreted the court's
own precedent, its conclusion as to the relationship between chap
ter 151B and section 85K was pellucid. "A fair reading of both stat
utes," the court stated in no uncertain terms, "does not support the
extension of the charitable cap to damages awarded for successful
claims under [chapter] 151B."91 Interestingly, however, neither
Ayash nor any of the cases upon which it was based (most notably
McMillan) said anything about chapter 151B's federal analogue, Ti
tle VII. Accordingly, there may still be room for charities con
fronted with employment discrimination claims to maintain the
protection of the damages cap.
III.

TITLE VII

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed on July 2, 1964, less
than one year after the assassination of President John F. Ken
nedy.92 The bill had been originally submitted by the late President
as a way to remedy the racial segregation of African Americans in
many facets of daily life. 93 Regarding employment, however, the
87. Id. at 688.
88. Id.
89. See generally Note, The Operation of State Fair Employment Practices Com
missions, 68 HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (1955).
90. See 1969 Mass. Acts 115.
91. Ayash, 822 N.E.2d at 688.
92. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
93. For example, Title I concerned voting rights and Title II dealt with accommo
dation at public places. See generally DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
LAW: TEXT AND CASES 387-466 (South-Western CollegelWest 12th ed. 2004) (describ
ing history of Title VII).
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Act was quite broad, going beyond race-based discrimination. Title
VII of the Act made it an "unlawful employment practice" to dis
criminate against any individual with regard to his or her "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."94 Like chapter 151B, Title
VII also prohibited retaliation against any individual because he or
she opposed a discriminatory employment practice or engaged in
other protected conduct. 95 In addition, again similar to chapter
151B, Title VII contained comprehensive prelitigation administra
tive requirements. 96 All of these provisions still exist today.
A main purpose of Title VII is to make victims of unlawful
employment discrimination whole. 97 As initially enacted, however,
the only available remedies were injunctive relief and reinstate
ment, with or without back pay.98 Noting this inequity, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow the recovery of a
broad range of compensatory and punitive damages,99 and to give
plaintiffs the right to a jury trial.1°O Even before those amend
ments, however, several circuit courts had already considered dis
crimination suits under federal law as analogous to tort actions
seeking to redress personal injuries.1 ol Indeed, as early as 1978, the
Supreme Court itself had deemed "distress"-a main component of
Title VII damages-to be a tort-based "personal injury."102
The particular issue of whether Title VII claims could be con
sidered "torts" came to a head in the Court's 1992 decision in
United States v. Burke .103 In Burke, the Court was confronted with
the question whether a Title VII settlement payment could be ex
cluded from taxable income as "damages received ... on account of
personal injuries."104 That question turned on another: whether Ti
tle VII injuries and claims were "personal and tort-like in na
94. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
95. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
96. See CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1:69-1:97 (West 1997-2004).
97. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
98. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
99. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 10:; Stat. 1099 (1991).
100. 42 u.s.c. § 1981a(c).
101. See, e.g., Rickel v. Comm'r., 900 F.2d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (deeming dis
crimination claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act, a companion statute
to Title VII, to be akin to a tort action); Pistillo v. Comm'r., 912 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir.
1990) (similar).
102. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978).
103. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
104. Id. at 230.
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ture."105 The Court said "no"-Title VII claims were not
necessarily tort-like-but, and this is important, only insofar as the
statute existed prior to the 1991 amendments. 106 The amendments
which made compensatory and punitive damages recoverable, the
Court continued, "signal[ed] a marked change in [Congress'] con
ception of the injury redressable by Title VII."107
For example, the Court observed, "A 'tort' has been defined
broadly as a 'civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which
the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for dam
ages.' "108 Title VII claims, as amended, fit that definition nicely. In
addition, the Court continued, torts make available "a broad range
of damages to compensate [a] plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by
the violation of his [or her] legal rights.' "109 Again, the amended
version of Title VII comports fully with that definition.
True, the Burke Court went on to opine that Title VII, as origi
nally enacted, did not allow awards for compensatory or punitive
damages and, thus, it would have been difficult, under the original
language, to have deemed a Title VII cause of action a "tort."110
However, the "marked change" signified by the 1991 amendments
would appear to put to rest any doubt that Title VII discrimination
claims are "torts."111 Today, just like other tort litigants, Title VII
plaintiffs can seek "compensatory damages for 'future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses,' as well as
punitive damages."1l2 They also have the right to a jury trial.1 13
Since Burke, the trend in Title VII jurisprudence has indeed
been to view post-amendment Title VII actions as akin to common
law tort claims.1 14 As one court put it, where a Title VII award
105. Id. at 232 (quoting Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121 (6th Cir.
1991».
106. See id. at 233-42.
107. Id. at 241 n.12.
108. Id. at 234 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON
& DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (5th ed. 1984».
109. Id. at 235 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978».
110. See id. at 237-42.
111. Id. at 241 n.12.
112. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000».
113. 42 U.S.c. § 1981a(c) (2005).
114. See, e.g., Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1993 WL
557652, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 1993); King v. Webb (In re Webb), 214 B.R. 553,
557-58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see also Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1220
n.18 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that the 1991 amendments which allow recovery of com
pensatory and punitive damages "throw doubt on the continued validity of the Burke
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compensates "traditional tort-like harms," it ought to be viewed
under the tort umbrella. 11s Commentators have also considered Ti
tle VII discrimination suits to be a species of tort law.116
What does all of this have to do with Massachusetts's damages
cap? Put simply, a legitimate argument can be made that the cap
(deemed inapplicable to chapter 151B discrimination claims) can
still be applied to claims brought under Title VII. Given Burke and
its progeny, it seems clear that most Title VII discrimination claims,
particularly those seeking compensatory and/or punitive damages,
are torts. At the very least, it would appear that Title VII claims
are causes of action "based on tort," as that phrase is liberally used
in section 85K. Accordingly, Massachusetts charities, although they
may have lost the chapter 151B battie, can still argue that their
damages for successful Title VII discrimination claims should be
capped at $20,000.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Did the Supreme Judicial Court in Ayash misinterpret section
85K when it held that chapter 151B discrimination claims are not
causes of action "based on tort"? Or worse, did the court engraft
new language onto the damages cap?117 Perhaps-but that chapter
is now closed. Charities that are sued for employment discrimina
holding"); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077,1079 n.l (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting
that "Burke may not apply to Title VII actions filed after the 1991 changes to the Civil
Rights Act"). Of course, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has deemed the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 not "tort-like" because its monetary
remedies "are limited to back wages, which are clearly of an 'economic character,' and
liquidated damages, which ... serve no compensatory function." Comm'r. v. Schleier,
515 U.S. 323, 336 (1995). Title VII, as indicated, is not so constrained.
115. In re Webb, 214 B.R. at 558.
116. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title Vll Hostile
Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375 (1998); Juanita Wil
liams, Comment, Title Vll Discrimination (The Dignitary Tort): Is it Personal?, 18 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 263 (1993).
117. Clearly, the Supreme Judicial Court recognizes that the "time tested wisdom
of the separation of powers" requires courts "to avoid judicial legislation in the guise of
new constructions to meet real or supposed new popular viewpoints, preserving always
to the Legislature alone its proper prerogative of adjusting the statutes to changed con
ditions." Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Mass. 1996)
(quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 334 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. 1975» (citation and in
ternal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed this principle
less than one week after its decision in Ayash. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822
N.E.2d 1134, 1161 (Mass. 2005) ("Th[e] principles [of separation of powers] call for the
judiciary to refrain from intruding into the power and function of another branch of
government ....") (quoting LIMITS v. President of the Senate, 604 N.E.2d 1307 (Mass.
1992» (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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tion under state law can no longer seek refuge in section 85K. The
question of whether the cap applies to Title VII discrimination
claims, however, may be another story.

